Tues

Authority 950 Ltd. 1/1/28

By Stling, NARS, Date 1/21/28



SUBJECT: State Message to USUN (30 October 1962) regarding UN Inspection Procedures

- 1. What measures in this plan will prevent, or even restrict the normal and expected Communist tactic of systematic delay in carrying out substantive measures of inspection?
- 2. What assurance will the U.S. have as to the technical competence of the inspectors to be used? We can expect the Communists to press for the inclusion of non-technical personnel from the less-developed countries. The U.S. will find it difficult to refuse many of these people without offending their governments. Is not some statement regarding U.S. satisfaction regarding the technical competence of the inspection personnel a requirement?
- 3. Does the phrase on page 2, "some" serial reconstissance constitute a neecless limitation upon our aerial surveillance? Does the remark that we should have access to photos of UK reconsissance mean all photos?
- 4. Is the reference to the Brazilian resolution in this message in our best interests? Why can this not be excluded and attention directed specifically to the Cuban matter? In addition, mention of the Security Council as an executive agent appears to leave the door open to inclusion of the Security Council in the Cuban inspection.
 - 5. Is surveillance and inspection to be limited to missile weapons systems only?
 - 6. Would inspection cover only "Cargoes" or do we mean, as we should, that all items entering and leaving Cuba will be subject to inspection if desired?
 - 7. Are we talking of inspecting ship cargoes, for will we have provisions to inspect Air Cargoes?
 - 8. Is the inspection scheme based on the principle that there must be 100% assurance that no nuclear delivery capability remains in Cuba? It appears that the cable provides for only loose verification of what the Soviets/Cubans desire to ship in or out? Other material can be hidden.
 - 9. What offensive actions can be taken if inspection is conducted in part and a disagreement and/or impasse results? Are we not inhibited to an undesirable degree?





- 10. If inspection at sea, how will inspectors determine the contents of crates or containers in the bottom of the hold? Are U.N. teams prepared to off-load cargoes onto barges in the open sea?
- 11. How will inspectors verify the contents of sealed containers? Will they take the Soviets' word, or will they break the seals and physically inspect?
- 12. Is U.N. prepared to continue such inspection procedures indefinitely?
- 13. American shipping firms have stated that almost anything can be concealed aboard ship if adequate time is available and proper planning is accomplished. Are UN inspection teams equipped to cope with professional "smugglers"?
- 14. Can inspectors distinguish between offensive weapon components and other non-offensive weapon components (SAMs, jet fighter engines, etc.)?
- 15. What action is contemplated in the event offensive weapons are discovered on an inbound ship?
- 16. What assurance do we have that Red Cross can furnish technically competent people?
- 17. What practical limits will we accept on right to open all boxes?
- 18. Why depend on Soviet inventory?
- 19. Even if Soviets furnish inventory, shouldn't UN inspection force verify by physical check?
- 20. Shouldn't US continue surveillance/reconnaissance until comparison of UN reconnaissance photos shows their coverage as good as US?
- 21. Will the use of T-lls fill the requirement to detect hidden and/or camouflaged materiel? Will not infra-red and radar equipment be required for night and weather operations when clandestine work can be expected?
- 22. If the number and qualifications of the inspectors are limited could they not be overwhelmed by work, does the number proposed take into account the possibility of being deceived by false rumors and other deception measures?
- 23. On what day from the present will we know that no missile can be fired, no aircraft can be launched? Dismantling may take a month, disarming could take a day.

